Paranoia: Friend To The Vulnerable.
This writer had the good fortune to live across the bay from the Port of Tacoma in the tiny enclave of Browns Point, Washington for a good number of years. The Port of Tacoma is a huge cargo-container center and a major force in the economics of Washington State.
It was common knowledge albeit ‘hush-hush’ that technology existed similar to what Stephen E. Flynn and Lawrence M. Wein describe in the article below and that, indeed, the Port of Tacoma was either using or testing this technology as part of their routine procedure for inspecting cargo containers coming into America from the Far East. This ‘common knowledge’ was available in the mid-1990’s and given the massive progress in technology one would have to assume that the ability to ensure the safety of America from any sort of terrorist sneak-attack by means of containerized cargo would be by this point a highly available and as nearly fool-proof a technology as is possible.
One would also have to consider the nightmare scenario entangled in the remains of September 11, 2001: that the attack on the World Trade Center was promulgated by our own politicians, by a cabal in America, by the bone-marrow deep greed and cynicism of whoever manages Bush and Company—by whatever horrible spin one would choose to place on this event. Anything is possible, and that is what is so awe-inspiring about considering the possibility that whatever this ‘cabal’ might be—and if it really exists—now that exposure seems to be a sure thing—what will these monsters need to do to re-focus our attention on sources outside America being the enemy rather than sources inside America being the enemy?
Yes. It is easily possible to approach paranoia in these matters, but quite often, ‘paranoia’ is a friend to the vulnerable. Now that we are beginning to get glimpses of what has been possible behind the scenes in Congress, The House of Representatives, The White House, The Supreme Court, we need to be alert and focused on the potential for destruction that lurks in the hearts of these criminals.
Word.
____________________________________________________________________________________
November 29, 2005
Op-Ed Contributors
Think Inside the Box
By STEPHEN E. FLYNN and LAWRENCE M. WEIN
THIS week President Bush will seek to focus the nation's attention on border security and immigration reform. But the president's proposals won't protect Americans from our gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon.
The Bush administration maintains that it has a smart strategy to reduce this risk. A new 24-Hour Rule requires that importers report the contents of their containers to customs inspectors one day before the boxes are loaded on ships bound for the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's National Targeting Center then reviews the data, checking against other intelligence to determine which boxes may pose a threat. Although the containers deemed high risk are inspected at cooperating foreign ports or when they enter the United States, the rest - more than 90 percent - land here without any perusal.
We have two concerns about this strategy. First, it presumes that the United States government has good enough intelligence about Al Qaeda to reliably discern which containers are suspicious and which are not. But our inability to thwart the attacks in Iraq demonstrates that we lack such specific tactical intelligence. And supporting customs inspectors, who must make the first assessment of risk, is not a priority for the intelligence agencies. Inspectors must rely on their experience in spotting anomalies - a company that claims to be exporting pineapples from Iceland, for example.
Second, determined terrorists can easily take advantage of the knowledge that customs inspectors routinely designate certain shipments as low risk. A container frequently makes 10 or more stops between its factory of origin and the vessel carrying it to American shores. Many of the way stations are in poorly policed parts of the world. Because name-brand companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors are widely known to be considered low-risk, terrorists need only to stake out their shipment routes and exploit the weakest points to introduce a weapon of mass destruction. A terrorist cell posing as a legal shipping company for more than two years, or a terrorist truck driver hauling goods from a well-known shipper, can also be confident of being perceived as low risk.
So what needs to be done? A pilot project under way in Hong Kong, the world's largest container port along with Singapore, offers one piece of a potential solution. At an estimated cost of $7 per container, new technology can photograph the box's exterior, screen for radioactive material, and collect a gamma-ray image of a box's contents while the truck on which it is carried moves at 10 miles per hour.
Terrorists can defeat radiation sensors by shielding a dirty bomb with dense materials like lead. But by combining those sensors with gamma ray images, the Hong Kong system allows inspectors to sound the alarm on suspiciously dense objects. Inspectors would need to analyze enough of the scans - perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent - to convince terrorists that there is a good chance that an indistinct image will lead a container's contents to be sent for more reliable X-ray or manual examinations. Images of container contents would then be reviewed remotely by inspectors inside the United States who are trained to spot possible nuclear weapons.
If terrorists were to succeed in shipping a dirty bomb, for example, the database of these images could serve as a kind of black box - an invaluable forensic tool in the effort to identify how and where security was breached. That information could help prevent politicians from reacting spasmodically and freezing the entire container system after an attack.
Such a program could significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists will smuggle plutonium or a dirty bomb through American ports. But it still would not stop a terrorist from importing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Lengthening the time that a container is screened for radiation would help, and this could be done without increasing waiting times if additional monitors were added to the Hong Kong system near the gate where the trucks must already stop for driver identification checks. Better still would be for the Department of Homeland Security to make the development of new technology that can recognize the unique signature of highly enriched uranium an urgent priority.
Finally, we must find ways to ensure that terrorists do not breach containers before shipments arrive at loading ports. Sensors should be installed inside containers in order to track their movements, detect any infiltration and discern the presence of radioactive material. Where boxes are loaded, certified independent inspectors should verify that companies have followed adequate protocols to ensure that legitimate and authorized goods are being shipped.
Taken together, these recommendations will require new investments and an extraordinary degree of international cooperation. But increased container security will not only help the United States prevent terrorism, it will also help all countries reduce theft, stop the smuggling of drugs and humans, crack down on tariff evasion and improve export controls. What's more, such a program would require an investment of just one one-hundredth of the capital that could be lost if we shut down the global container shipping system after an attack.
Container security is a complex problem with enormous stakes. American officials insist that existing programs have matters well in hand. But we cannot afford to take these perky reassurances at face value while the same officials fail to embrace promising initiatives like the Hong Kong pilot project.
Stephen E. Flynn, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "America the Vulnerable." Lawrence M. Wein is a professor at Stanford's graduate school of business.
Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company
__________________________________________________________________________________
SLEAZE FACTOR MAY CLEAN HOUSE
By JOHN PODHORETZ
FIFTY weeks from now, Americans will vote in the 2006 midterm elections. Republicans hold the House of Representatives by 232-202, so Democrats need a pickup of 16 seats to take control. Can they do it?
Out of 435 total House seats, 16 doesn't sound like a very big number. But according to the obsessive House followers, like Amy Walter of the Cook Political Report, the number of seats that will see competitive races is astoundingly low — just 53 that could go either way by one count, and in another, more realistic reckoning, that drops to just 27.
So a Democratic knockout punch would seem highly unlikely. They'd need to reach into solid Republican territory and take seats in areas that have been Bush country since before Bush won in 2000.
But an X-factor may place the GOP's majority in great jeopardy. Not Iraq or the president's low standing — it all has to do with a really disgusting Republican lobbyist named Jack Abramoff.
Abramoff is under indictment on charges of fraud, as are two of his closest associates. The question is whether the growing scandal swirling around Abramoff will soon ensnare a number of GOP House members. This may prove to be the worst Washington corruption scandal since the Abscam sting nailed six congressmen and a senator 25 years ago.
According to press reports, six Republican congressmen may land in seriously hot water over their ties to Abramoff. The most prominent is former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (who's now battling an outrageously politicized indictment by a run-amok prosecutor in Texas).
The most deeply implicated appears to be Rep. Bob Ney of Ohio, who actually used his time on the House floor to deliver speeches attacking a Florida businessman who was in the midst of difficult negotiations with Abramoff over the price of a casino-boat company. After Ney's peculiar floor speech, the businessman caved in to Abramoff and the two became partners, together with an Abramoff associate named Adam Kidan.
A year later, with the casino-boat company in tatters, the businessman was murdered in a gangland hit in Fort Lauderdale. Four years passed, but then, in September, three reputed members of the Gambino crime family were arrested for the murder. In the months before the hit, one of the three mobsters had been put on the payroll of the casino-boat company by Abramoff's partner, Adam Kidan. (Matthew Continetti's brilliant recap of this unbelievable sequence of events for The Weekly Standard is available at weeklystandard.com.)
What began as an investigation into Abramoff's double-dealing with Indian tribes — he took huge sums of money from one tribe wanting to build a casino, then from another tribe trying to block the first one from building that casino — has turned into something far darker.
Abramoff was the most highly paid lobbyist in history. Now it turns out he got himself involved in a business transaction that probably led to a man being riddled with bullets on a Fort Lauderdale street.
Perhaps the criminal probe into Abramoff won't implicate a bunch of GOP congressmen. If so, the matter will simply stand as a testament to one man's unutterable greed and bad character. (Yesterday's guilty plea by Rep. Duke Cunningham in a bribery scandal is another example of greed and bad character, extending no farther than him.)
But it seems equally likely right now that the investigation will nab several GOP stalwarts. And if that happens, the Democrats will have a strong issue on which to run against the Republican Party nationwide in 2006 — a non-ideological assault based entirely on the corruption emanating from Jack Abramoff's extremely deep pockets.
That's just the sort of thing that could make all the prognostications about competitive seats and Republican strongholds meaningless.
Disgust is a powerful force in politics, and the Abramoff case is one that seems to be churning the stomachs of those Republicans and Democrats alike who know about it. If the whole country comes to know about it, watch out, GOP.
E-mail: podhoretz@nypost.com
Copyright 2005 NYP Holdings, Inc.
___________________________________________________________________
It was common knowledge albeit ‘hush-hush’ that technology existed similar to what Stephen E. Flynn and Lawrence M. Wein describe in the article below and that, indeed, the Port of Tacoma was either using or testing this technology as part of their routine procedure for inspecting cargo containers coming into America from the Far East. This ‘common knowledge’ was available in the mid-1990’s and given the massive progress in technology one would have to assume that the ability to ensure the safety of America from any sort of terrorist sneak-attack by means of containerized cargo would be by this point a highly available and as nearly fool-proof a technology as is possible.
One would also have to consider the nightmare scenario entangled in the remains of September 11, 2001: that the attack on the World Trade Center was promulgated by our own politicians, by a cabal in America, by the bone-marrow deep greed and cynicism of whoever manages Bush and Company—by whatever horrible spin one would choose to place on this event. Anything is possible, and that is what is so awe-inspiring about considering the possibility that whatever this ‘cabal’ might be—and if it really exists—now that exposure seems to be a sure thing—what will these monsters need to do to re-focus our attention on sources outside America being the enemy rather than sources inside America being the enemy?
Yes. It is easily possible to approach paranoia in these matters, but quite often, ‘paranoia’ is a friend to the vulnerable. Now that we are beginning to get glimpses of what has been possible behind the scenes in Congress, The House of Representatives, The White House, The Supreme Court, we need to be alert and focused on the potential for destruction that lurks in the hearts of these criminals.
Word.
____________________________________________________________________________________
November 29, 2005
Op-Ed Contributors
Think Inside the Box
By STEPHEN E. FLYNN and LAWRENCE M. WEIN
THIS week President Bush will seek to focus the nation's attention on border security and immigration reform. But the president's proposals won't protect Americans from our gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon.
The Bush administration maintains that it has a smart strategy to reduce this risk. A new 24-Hour Rule requires that importers report the contents of their containers to customs inspectors one day before the boxes are loaded on ships bound for the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's National Targeting Center then reviews the data, checking against other intelligence to determine which boxes may pose a threat. Although the containers deemed high risk are inspected at cooperating foreign ports or when they enter the United States, the rest - more than 90 percent - land here without any perusal.
We have two concerns about this strategy. First, it presumes that the United States government has good enough intelligence about Al Qaeda to reliably discern which containers are suspicious and which are not. But our inability to thwart the attacks in Iraq demonstrates that we lack such specific tactical intelligence. And supporting customs inspectors, who must make the first assessment of risk, is not a priority for the intelligence agencies. Inspectors must rely on their experience in spotting anomalies - a company that claims to be exporting pineapples from Iceland, for example.
Second, determined terrorists can easily take advantage of the knowledge that customs inspectors routinely designate certain shipments as low risk. A container frequently makes 10 or more stops between its factory of origin and the vessel carrying it to American shores. Many of the way stations are in poorly policed parts of the world. Because name-brand companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors are widely known to be considered low-risk, terrorists need only to stake out their shipment routes and exploit the weakest points to introduce a weapon of mass destruction. A terrorist cell posing as a legal shipping company for more than two years, or a terrorist truck driver hauling goods from a well-known shipper, can also be confident of being perceived as low risk.
So what needs to be done? A pilot project under way in Hong Kong, the world's largest container port along with Singapore, offers one piece of a potential solution. At an estimated cost of $7 per container, new technology can photograph the box's exterior, screen for radioactive material, and collect a gamma-ray image of a box's contents while the truck on which it is carried moves at 10 miles per hour.
Terrorists can defeat radiation sensors by shielding a dirty bomb with dense materials like lead. But by combining those sensors with gamma ray images, the Hong Kong system allows inspectors to sound the alarm on suspiciously dense objects. Inspectors would need to analyze enough of the scans - perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent - to convince terrorists that there is a good chance that an indistinct image will lead a container's contents to be sent for more reliable X-ray or manual examinations. Images of container contents would then be reviewed remotely by inspectors inside the United States who are trained to spot possible nuclear weapons.
If terrorists were to succeed in shipping a dirty bomb, for example, the database of these images could serve as a kind of black box - an invaluable forensic tool in the effort to identify how and where security was breached. That information could help prevent politicians from reacting spasmodically and freezing the entire container system after an attack.
Such a program could significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists will smuggle plutonium or a dirty bomb through American ports. But it still would not stop a terrorist from importing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Lengthening the time that a container is screened for radiation would help, and this could be done without increasing waiting times if additional monitors were added to the Hong Kong system near the gate where the trucks must already stop for driver identification checks. Better still would be for the Department of Homeland Security to make the development of new technology that can recognize the unique signature of highly enriched uranium an urgent priority.
Finally, we must find ways to ensure that terrorists do not breach containers before shipments arrive at loading ports. Sensors should be installed inside containers in order to track their movements, detect any infiltration and discern the presence of radioactive material. Where boxes are loaded, certified independent inspectors should verify that companies have followed adequate protocols to ensure that legitimate and authorized goods are being shipped.
Taken together, these recommendations will require new investments and an extraordinary degree of international cooperation. But increased container security will not only help the United States prevent terrorism, it will also help all countries reduce theft, stop the smuggling of drugs and humans, crack down on tariff evasion and improve export controls. What's more, such a program would require an investment of just one one-hundredth of the capital that could be lost if we shut down the global container shipping system after an attack.
Container security is a complex problem with enormous stakes. American officials insist that existing programs have matters well in hand. But we cannot afford to take these perky reassurances at face value while the same officials fail to embrace promising initiatives like the Hong Kong pilot project.
Stephen E. Flynn, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "America the Vulnerable." Lawrence M. Wein is a professor at Stanford's graduate school of business.
Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company
__________________________________________________________________________________
SLEAZE FACTOR MAY CLEAN HOUSE
By JOHN PODHORETZ
FIFTY weeks from now, Americans will vote in the 2006 midterm elections. Republicans hold the House of Representatives by 232-202, so Democrats need a pickup of 16 seats to take control. Can they do it?
Out of 435 total House seats, 16 doesn't sound like a very big number. But according to the obsessive House followers, like Amy Walter of the Cook Political Report, the number of seats that will see competitive races is astoundingly low — just 53 that could go either way by one count, and in another, more realistic reckoning, that drops to just 27.
So a Democratic knockout punch would seem highly unlikely. They'd need to reach into solid Republican territory and take seats in areas that have been Bush country since before Bush won in 2000.
But an X-factor may place the GOP's majority in great jeopardy. Not Iraq or the president's low standing — it all has to do with a really disgusting Republican lobbyist named Jack Abramoff.
Abramoff is under indictment on charges of fraud, as are two of his closest associates. The question is whether the growing scandal swirling around Abramoff will soon ensnare a number of GOP House members. This may prove to be the worst Washington corruption scandal since the Abscam sting nailed six congressmen and a senator 25 years ago.
According to press reports, six Republican congressmen may land in seriously hot water over their ties to Abramoff. The most prominent is former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (who's now battling an outrageously politicized indictment by a run-amok prosecutor in Texas).
The most deeply implicated appears to be Rep. Bob Ney of Ohio, who actually used his time on the House floor to deliver speeches attacking a Florida businessman who was in the midst of difficult negotiations with Abramoff over the price of a casino-boat company. After Ney's peculiar floor speech, the businessman caved in to Abramoff and the two became partners, together with an Abramoff associate named Adam Kidan.
A year later, with the casino-boat company in tatters, the businessman was murdered in a gangland hit in Fort Lauderdale. Four years passed, but then, in September, three reputed members of the Gambino crime family were arrested for the murder. In the months before the hit, one of the three mobsters had been put on the payroll of the casino-boat company by Abramoff's partner, Adam Kidan. (Matthew Continetti's brilliant recap of this unbelievable sequence of events for The Weekly Standard is available at weeklystandard.com.)
What began as an investigation into Abramoff's double-dealing with Indian tribes — he took huge sums of money from one tribe wanting to build a casino, then from another tribe trying to block the first one from building that casino — has turned into something far darker.
Abramoff was the most highly paid lobbyist in history. Now it turns out he got himself involved in a business transaction that probably led to a man being riddled with bullets on a Fort Lauderdale street.
Perhaps the criminal probe into Abramoff won't implicate a bunch of GOP congressmen. If so, the matter will simply stand as a testament to one man's unutterable greed and bad character. (Yesterday's guilty plea by Rep. Duke Cunningham in a bribery scandal is another example of greed and bad character, extending no farther than him.)
But it seems equally likely right now that the investigation will nab several GOP stalwarts. And if that happens, the Democrats will have a strong issue on which to run against the Republican Party nationwide in 2006 — a non-ideological assault based entirely on the corruption emanating from Jack Abramoff's extremely deep pockets.
That's just the sort of thing that could make all the prognostications about competitive seats and Republican strongholds meaningless.
Disgust is a powerful force in politics, and the Abramoff case is one that seems to be churning the stomachs of those Republicans and Democrats alike who know about it. If the whole country comes to know about it, watch out, GOP.
E-mail: podhoretz@nypost.com
Copyright 2005 NYP Holdings, Inc.
___________________________________________________________________
posted by FancyRage at 10:05 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home